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Abstract
In economics and game theory agents are assumed to fol-
low a model of perfect rationality. This model of rational-
ity assumes that the rational agent knows all and will take
the action that maximizes her utility. We can ﬁnd evidence
in the psychology and economics literature as well as in our
own lives that shows human beings do not satisfy this deﬁ-
nition of rationality. Thus there are many who look to study
some notion of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, models
of bounded rationality suffer from the exact phenomena that
they attempt to explain. Speciﬁcally, models of bounded ra-
tionality are bounded. Understanding the limits of various
rationality models will make clearer their contribution and
place in the overall picture of rationality.
Introduction
There are three primary motivations for deﬁning and study-
ing bounded rationality. The ﬁrst is that under the assump-
tion of perfect rationality, “rational decision can be detri-
mental to the satisfaction of self-interest” -Max Black. The
ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, which will we present
in detail later, is the archetypal example of this less than sat-
isfactory situation. The second reason for studying bounded
rationality is the computational infeasibility of perfect ratio-
nality in all but the simplest of situations. The typical exam-
ple here is the game of chess though any NP-hard problem
will sufﬁce. Thethirdreasonforbeinginterestedin bounded
rationality is that humans rarely exemplify the perfect ratio-
nality model. Examples of this can be found in psychol-
ogy and experimental economics experiment results. These
deviation include choosing differently among the same two
options if they are presented in different by equivalent con-
texts (framing effects), simplifying even basic problems and
thus picking suboptimal actions, and a lack of indifference
to irrelevant alternatives.
Anypaperdealingwith boundedrationalitywill citesome
form of one or all of these as motivation for the work. How-
ever,it is oftenthecasethattheboundedrationalitymodel(s)
that follow these motivations are not linked back to them.
Thus the reader is left to determine how and when the given
model actually addresses these problems with perfect ratio-
nality. In most cases, the model addresses only one of these
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issues and sometimes only in very speciﬁc instances. It is
often not obvious which issue a particular model addresses
and what that model’s contributionis in the larger context of
understandingbounded rationality. In this paper, we present
several models from the literature and determine which of
these issue they address. We then present ideas of how each
contributes to our overall understanding of rationality.
History
Concepts of rationality that deviate from that of prefect ra-
tionality are not new. In fact, philosophers have long strug-
gled with and debated the deﬁnition of rationality. In his
discussion of rationality, Black presents several deﬁnitions
present by past and present philosophers(Black 1990). For
some, rationality is that which differentiates humans from
other “lesser” animals. “A faculty in man, that faculty
whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts,
and wherein it is evident that he much surpasses them.” -
John Locke (1894). The classical conception of “reason”
was as the separate faculty that bridles forces of passion.
(note: modern philosophyalso regards active intelligence as
beingmotivatedby passion) BertrandRussell deﬁned the ra-
tional choice as the choice of the right means for the ends.
On the other hand, Micheal Oakeshott regarded behaviour
as rational if it was faithful to the individuals knowledge of
how to behave well. Thus while some philosophers would
deﬁne rationality using a deﬁnition similar to that of perfect
rationality (ex. Bertrand Russell) there are many conﬂicting
views even at this high level. The length of this debate and
the variety of deﬁnitions highlight the fact that understand-
ing rationality is not a new or simple task.
Abstract Models
Herbert Simon was a pioneer and verbal proponent of
bounded rationality in Economics. His description of
bounded rationality is perhaps the closest to human ratio-
nality. His theory is based on the idea that there are two
approachesto solving intractable problems. The ﬁrst is opti-
mizing. A boundedlyrational agent that optimizes ﬁrst ﬁnds
an appropriate approximation of the given problem. The
agent then determines the optimum solution to the approxi-
mationanduses this as thesolution to the initial problem(Si-
mon 1982). We do this anytime we model a really worldproblem. Take for example the use of the perfect rational-
ity model in economics. This model is used to ﬁnd optimal
equilibriumand the results are then used in the predictreally
world activities eventhoughthe real worldsituation maynot
apply perfect rationality. The second strategy is to saticﬁce.
Here the agent will search possible solutions until a solution
that is satisfactory is found. For example when searching
for a course project topic a student will search until he ﬁnds
one that is good enough. Note searching all possible topics
wouldpreventthe studentfromeveractuallydoinga project.
Simon provides strong and convincingarguments that the
pursuit of bounded rationality modes is a worthwhile en-
deavour. His main contribution is the presentation of a
frameworkfrom which to view boundedrationality. It is im-
portant to have such a framework to guide the development
of models. It is also important to be aware of the limitations
of the framework. One issue to be aware of is that these two
strategies may be intermixed. With this in mind the ques-
tion becomes how can we apply these notions to describe or
predict/prescribe rational behaviour.
Concrete Models
With the knowledge from philosophy that we need to con-
sider what we mean by bounded rationality and Simon’s
framework as a possible guide we will now look at some
more concrete models of bounded rationality.
Rational Rules
One of the results of psychology experiments that shows
people do not always behave perfectly rationally is that we
tendto simplifya problem(evena relativelysimple one)and
this simpliﬁcation can lead to choices that do not maximize
utility (Rubinstein 1998). One form simpliﬁcation can
take is the cancelling out of similar parts. The motivating
example found in Rubinstein is a choice between two
lotteries. A lottery where x is awarded with probability p
and 0 is rewarded with probability 1   p is represented by
(x;p).
Given the choice between
L3 = (4000;0:2) and L4 = (3000;0:25)
the popular choice is L3.
However, given the choice between
L1 = (4000;0:8) and L2 = (3000;1:0)
the most common choice is L2.
Notice, however, that L3 and L4 can also be expressed as
L3 = 0:25L1 + 0:75[0] and L4 = 0:25L2 + 0:75[0]
Thus the preference for L3 on one hand and L2 on the
other violates the von Neumann-Morgensternindependence
axiom. The theory is that when choosing between lotteries
of these types people try to simplify by cancelling similar
parts of the vectors. So when confronted L3 and L4 people
determine that 0:2 and 0:25 are similar but 4000 and 3000
are not so they choose L3. However, neither part of L1 and
L2 is considered similar so another choice function, perhaps
risk aversion, operates instead. Rubinstein takes this choice
rule, formalizes it and shows that there is a preference rela-
tion that is consistent with it.
This rule is obviously motivated by the fact that humans
are not perfectly rational and it is believable that humans do
use rules such as this in their reasoning. The argument for
this one is quite convincing. Though Rubinstein presents
an argument that this similarity procedure is consistent with
rational behaviour he does not go further and explain why
this is interesting. Alone this simpliﬁcation rule may not be
that interesting as it simply gives an explanation for human
behaviour in a very particular case, choosing between two
choices represented as probability vectors. In fact, in most
situations, this rule alone is unlikely to predict human be-
haviour and even in the example used to motivate it there is
the assumption of a risk aversion rule being applied when
simpliﬁcation is not sufﬁcient.
The contribution then is that the formalization and argu-
ment that this formalization is consist with rationality given
a appropriate preference relation shows a possible way of
describing and analyzing rules such as this one as rational.
Sincethereallybeneﬁtofunderstandingsucha rulecanonly
be fullyrealized by understandingit in the contextof a set of
such rules, there are several interesting questions left. What
would a full set or even a substantial subset of such rules
look like? When do individual rules apply and how do rules
interact? Is it possible to formalize sets of rules and con-
struct a preference relation that works for all of them? Ru-
binstein’s work suggests a way in which experiment knowl-
edge of human behaviour might be used to construct a more
formal model of these rational processes.
Bounding information
One way to bound rationality is to put constraints or add
costs to the information that is used to make the rational
decision. Rubinstein identiﬁes three costs of information:
acquisition, memory and communicating. The theory pre-
sented assumes that the agent optimizes on what to know.
However, this can often be a harder optimization problem
than the original and thus seems a bit hard to justify in terms
of providing understanding of how humans rationalize. Ru-
binstein claims there are situations were this makes sense
but does not back up this claim beyond saying that these are
situations were the decision maker regularly applies a rule
to make a decision and only occasionally considers which
rule to apply taking into account its complexity. One case
where this may apply is in terms of developing AI systems
where trade offs could be determined while designing the
system. In general, however, expecting that even occasion-
ally a hard problem is solved may not be reasonable. Espe-
cially in the very likely case that it is an NP-hard optimiza-
tion problem. Rather the true value of a model such as this
may lie in the argument often applied in a economics to the
justify the perfect rationality model. That is that there are
some situations in which people tend to act “as if” they areoptimizing the knowledgethey acquire, store and communi-
cate takinginto accountthe complexityof doingso. Perhaps
using this model could lead to more satisfying equilibria in
problems where the perfect rationality model leaves us with
only unsatisfying equilibrium.
A bounded memory model
One bound on rationality is memory. How much informa-
tion can be stored? One way to model memory is to use a
ﬁnite automaton and consider the number of states to rep-
resent the amount of memory available. In this model, the
states represent the agents strategy. States correspond to the
agent’s actions and transitions correspond to the opponent’s
actions. This model leads to some interesting results specif-
ically in terms of the ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game.
Prisoner’s dilemma The archetypal example of a situa-
tion in which perfect rationality leads to unsatisfactory re-
sults is the game known as prisoner’s dilemma. (Figure1)
The story that goes with the game is that two prisoner’s are
being interrogated by the police. They both have the choice
of not revealing anything (cooperating with the other pris-
oner) or of signing a deal and agreeing to testify against the
other (defecting). If both cooperate they will both go to jail
for a short period of time on a lesser charge. If one cooper-
ates and the other defects, the defector will go free and the
cooperator will serve a long sentence. If both defect, both
will go to jail for an intermediary length of time. In pris-
oner’s dilemma the dominate strategy of both players is to
defect. This is because no matter what the “column” player
does “row”is better offdefecting. If columncooperatesthen
row gets a reward of 4 instead of the 3 he would have got if
he cooperated. If column defects then row gets a reward
of 1, instead of the 0 he would have got if he had cooper-
ated. Since both players will defect, they will both receive
a reward of 1. However, it is obviously preferable for both
players to cooperate thus both getting a reward of 3.
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Figure 1: The payoffs for the prisoner’s dilemma.
This situation where both players defect is also the only
Nash-equilibrium if the game is played n-times. Note a
Nash-equilibrium is a set of strategies such that no indi-
vidual player can improve his reward by deviating from the
given strategy. The proof is by backwards induction. In the
last round the best thing to do is to defect (by the same ar-
gument as for the one shot game). Since defection is the
only option in the last round there is no reason to collabo-
rate in the second last round and so on. This result seems
even less “rational” than that of the one shoot game. Note
that two versionsof prisoner’sdilemma that do lead to coop-
erative play are the inﬁnitely repeated game and the ﬁnitely
repeated game where the number of games is unknown.
Automaton with fewer than n-states By limiting agents
to strategies that can be modelled using ﬁnite automaton
of particular sizes dependent on the number of rounds it is
possible to get more satisfying equilibrium (Papadimitriou
& Yannakakis 1994). In the n-prisoner’s dilemma, if both
agents strategies are limited to less than n-states then they
can not count to n and so cannot apply backwards induction.
In this case, a basic strategy known as tit-for-tat (Figure2)
can be shown to be an equilibrium(Papadimitriou & Yan-
nakakis 1994).
Figure 2: Tit-for-Tat: In repeated prisoner’s dilemma, a
strategy of always co-operating unless the other defects. If
the other defects then defect one round to punish. This strat-
egy can be played using the above two state automaton.
Automaton with fewer than exponential states The
moreinterestingcaseis wheretheautomatonhavemorethan
n-states but where at least one has less then exponential in n
states.
Theorem 1 (Papadimitriou & Yannakakis 1994) For every
 > 0, in the n-round prisoner’s dilemma played by au-
tomata with size bounds. If at least one of the bounds is
< 2cn then there is a mixed strategy equilibrium with aver-
age payoff for each player at least 3   . (c = =6(1 + ))
In other words, that it is possible to construct a mixed
strategy equilibrium such that both players get payoffs arbi-
trarily close to the payoff they would receive if they cooper-
ated in every round. The equilibrium strategy involves sev-
eral looping components. For the ﬁrst d rounds the players
state a business card or series of moves (selected according
to their mixed strategy). Here d depends on the size bound
of the players. Later an agent is required to remember the
business card of his opponentand thus must store all 2d pos-
sible cards. After this exchange, the agents play according
to some rules which even out any advantage one might have
gained over the other in the ﬁrst d rounds. Next they loop
over two stages. The ﬁrst is collaboration for a large num-
ber of rounds (determined by their size). The second is a
sequence that depends on both the presented business cards.This stage has two purposes: to even out advantageousbusi-
ness cards and to show that agents remember each other’s
business cards. If ever the other player does not play as ex-
pectedthenthe agentgoesintoa state ofperpetualdefection.
The construction is such that the players must use all states
toplaythestrategyandthusdonothaveanystates remaining
to count and apply backward induction. In fact, even if one
player does have exponentially many states and can count
then the only difference will be that he defects in the last
round (since doing so earlier will not increase his payoff).
Implications When presenting this work the author’s mo-
tivate it by saying that it remedies the “unnatural” or even
“irrational” predictions of game theory in the n-round pris-
oner’s dilemma. This is true in that by using this model the
given strategies are an equilibrium where cooperation pre-
vails. However, this model does not satisfy our desire to
model human behaviour for a couple of reasons. Specif-
ically, cooperation that arises in prisoner’s dilemma when
playedby humans is unlikely to arise from such an elaborate
equilibrium. Also given a small numberof games (say 10) it
does not seem satisfactory to say that cooperation arises be-
cause we do not have enough memory to count. Especially,
consideringthat knowingthe backwardsinductionargument
does not prevent people from collaborating.
However, there are actually several other ways that this
work contributes to the bounded rationality literature. One
is the “as if” argument used to defend the perfect rationality
assumption. That is that people behave “as if”, as if they
were perfectly rational or in this case as if they had less than
exponential memory in the number of rounds. Of course it
is unlikely that this is always true anymore than it is always
true for the perfect rationality assumption; however, it may
be a useful approach when the assumption holds. The other
contributionof this work is that it shows how simple (tit-for-
tat) and/or complex (sub-exponential equilibria) automaton
representationof strategies may be. Finally, perhaps by con-
trasting the strategies employed by humans with those that
invoke equilibria in ﬁnite automaton it is possible to learn
more about human rationality. For example, that we play
more like automaton with less than n-states then like those
with more than n-states.
Limited foresight reasoning
The motivating example for limited foresight reasoning is
the game of chess. Each game is a series of moves ending
in one of three outcomes. Using a backward induction ar-
gument on terminal histories, Zermelo proved at the begin-
ningofthe twentiethcenturythat chesshas aninherentvalue
(whitewins, blackwins, ordraw). However,this valueis un-
known since ﬁnding it would require enumerating all possi-
ble game histories a low estimate of which is 1040. Further-
more, because of this intractability a player can not select
the move guaranteed to give her the best possible outcome.
Yet without being able to see every possible outcome of the
game chess players are able to play “rationally”.
Players ofchess employseveralstrategiesfordetermining
good moves. One is to select reasonable candidate moves
(likelybasedonpastexperienceandknowledgeofthegame)
and then to look ahead several moves to see how the game
may progress.
A couple simple models of this look ahead behaviour are
discussed by Rubinstein. In both models it is assumed that
theplayerknowsthe equilibriumactionsofbothhimselfand
his opponent for the next k moves (Rubinstein 1998). The
goal for the agent is to maximize the payoffs collected over
these k moves. In one model, the agent may only change
the current move but not his future moves. In the other, the
opponent’sactions are assumed to be ﬁxed but the agent can
optimize over changes to all of his next k moves. Both mod-
els lead to reasonable deﬁnitions of equilibrium. However,
intuitively they are not very satisfactory. The ﬁrst because
an agent must treat his future moves as determined even
though he can inﬂuence then. In both the opponents moves
are treated as given, though it is likely the opponent’s strat-
egy will change dependingon how the agent acts. The value
of these models is most likely in the fact that they do not
provide a very satisfactory description of limited foresight
reasoning and thus present the challenge of creating a better
model.
Bounded Optimality
Russell et al. deﬁne a model of rationality they believe is
appropriatefor determiningif an AI system exhibits rational
behaviour(Russell & Subramanian 1993). To motivate the
approach taken four possible deﬁnitions of rationality are
given. The ﬁrst three are currently used in AI and the fourth
is the proposed deﬁnition upon which the paper is based.
1. Perfect rationality: The rational agent always acts in such
a way as to maximize his utility.
2. Calculative rationality: The rational agent eventually
gives the answer that would have been optimal at the start
of its deliberation.
3. Metalevel rationality: The rational agent computes the
best sequence of computation plus action given that the
computation must select the action.
4. Bounded optimality: Speciﬁes optimal programs. A ra-
tional agent is an agent that does as well as possible given
its computational resources.
The desired property of intelligent systems was tradition-
ally deﬁnition 1 but this is not always computationally fea-
sible. Deﬁnition 2 is interesting in so far as it may demon-
strate that a system in principle would do the right thing but
is not generally useful in practise since it may take expo-
nential time to compute a solution. Finally, deﬁnition 3 of-
ten presents a problem that is harder than the original. One
common approach in AI is to to design calculatively ratio-
nal systems and then use speedups and approximationswith
the goal of getting close to the optimal. Approximations of
meta-level rationality have also proven successful in many
applications.
An agent function is a mapping from an agent’s percep-
tions to its actions. An agent’s program is what generates
its actions. The agent function is deﬁned in (Russell & Sub-
ramanian 1993) such that the action may be a null action
if the agent is still calculating. Russell et al. construct aframework for designing bounded optimal agents in speciﬁc
environments. A bounded optimal agent is deﬁned as an
agent that maximizes utility over all functions that are fea-
sible given the time constraints and a speciﬁed class of ma-
chines. Theyextendthe notionof boundedoptimalagents to
asymptotically bounded agents where the notion of asymp-
totic is symmetric to that found in complexity.
Thus this paper formalizes ideas about what is rational
when constraints do not permit perfect rationality. The
model is not useful in describing human rationality. How-
ever, it presents an plausible way for deﬁning boundedly ra-
tional AI systems.
Conclusion
The motivations for developingmodels of boundedrational-
ity are that the perfect rationality assumption does not al-
ways give reasonable results, may be infeasible in practise
and does not always reﬂect human rational behaviour. How-
ever, models of bounded rationality are also limited in their
ability to address these issues. Black sums up the complex-
ity of the issue, “... in philosophical discussions of rational-
ity, there is a sense in which we do not ’know what we are
talking about’ and can never do so.”(Black 1990)
The complexity of understanding rationality does not
mean that it is not worth pursuing the issue. Rather it sug-
gests that any comprehensive theory of rationality must in-
clude several models including perfect rationality. Various
models make different contributionsto our understandingof
rationality and are applicable in different situations.
In this paper we have examined several models that ad-
dress different aspects of bounded rationality. One model
thatwedidnotexaminebutthathascontributedsigniﬁcantly
to research involving rationality is the model of perfect ra-
tionality. One contribution of this model is the economics
and game theory that has been built up around it. The ar-
eas where this model falls short are exactly those in which
a model of bounded rationality may be interesting to exam-
ine. Together the models discussed in this paper start to ﬁll
in these holes. A high level and fairly abstract model of
bounded rationality is discussed by Simon. His work helps
to motivate a need for bounded rationality models and sug-
gests two boundedly rational approaches: optimizing an ap-
proximation to the problem and satisﬁcing or ﬁnding a sat-
isfactory solution to the problem. A much lower level look
at human rationality is provided by speciﬁc rules such as
the simplifying rule formalized by Rubinstein. An approach
that considers the cost of information to an agent suggests
optimizing over actions considering the complexity of the
information required for this action. This meta-level rea-
soning may be interesting in situations where on a regular
basis a rule is applied to make a decision but the decision
of which rule to apply need only be made once. Finite au-
tomaton models provide another way to study strategies and
equilibrium. Interesting comparisons may be made between
equilibrium foundin practise during human interactions and
those possible on ﬁnite automaton. Two limited by speciﬁc
models of optimizing subproblems are found in the k-look-
ahead models. Finally, a theory for discussing the optimal-
ity of a bounded agent in AI provides an interesting take on
boundedrationalitythat is motivatedby computationalcom-
plexity. Togetherthese models beginto describe some of the
complexity of rationality.
References
Black, M. 1990. Perplexities: Rational Choice, the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other
Puzzles. Cornell University Press.
Papadimitriou, C. H., and Yannakakis, M. 1994. On com-
plexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract). Proced-
ings of the twenty-sixth annualACM symposium on Theory
of computing 726–733.
Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT
Press.
Russell, S., andSubramanian,D. 1993. Provablybounded-
optimal agents. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence.
Simon, H. 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality: Behav-
ioral Economics and Business Organization. MIT Press.